Continuum: The Australian Journal of Media & Culture
Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991
Television and ...
Edited by John Hartley

Splitting the citizen

Toby Miller

Where do you find a citizen and how do you know when you've got one? It has been one of the abiding questions in political theory since the advent of the notion that when we are born, we enter an implied social contract with the state. This contract - to cede a certain autonomy of action in return for a certain amount of protection and service - is one that we are then said to be able to survey through the technologies and techniques of sovereignty: the parliamentary system, and latterly, pressure groups.

Already this paper encounters and propagates the central writing tactic of the discourse of citizenship: a public, not a royal, 'we'. The reader is positioned as ceding authority to the writer. But maybe not, because, after all, this is the age of the revived sovereign consumer, citizens who know what they want, who have had authority redistributed back to them in an age of deregulation that sees fealty to markets, not states, as freedom. And the reader too is free; dispense with this essay as you see fit.

Derrida knows about the difficulties in being clear about when you do and don't have a citizen before you. He found out when he was willing himself to be in Virginia in the seat of Jefferson. He was asking who it was that authored/authorised the Declaration of Independence. It was a collective text: Jefferson edited the work of others, who were held to represent the rest of an emergent America. The document was actually signed by an entity called "the American people", operating "in the name of God". Which came first? The document that 'the people' made sovereign? Or 'the people', that were made sovereign by the document? Derrida knows one or two other things after having pondered this for a time, things about 'the people':

the American people did not exist as the American people before having signed the Declaration of Independence. And it is in signing that they conferred upon themselves the right to call themselves the American people and the right to sign. It did not exist before the signature. Thus, the scriptor does not exist before the signature. The signature itself, which imposes the law, is in itself a performative act which in a certain way produces its own subject. 1

The quest for origins is without end, so to speak, as fruitful as it is interminable in a realm where 'what came first' is equally hard to establish in archival and conceptual senses. Did I exist before the country in which I was born honoured me with certification of the fact? Is it then that I made the mature decision, after all due consideration, to agree to the unwritten British constitution? Or did that come later?

Many countries ask broadcasting to fix this uncertainty up without fuss. Publicly-owned radio and television stations are routinely required by legislation to encourage unity and civic knowledge within the nationstates that fund them. Here, I want to talk about the kinds of subject produced within and producing the discourse of screen policy. I want to address the possible ways in which we can see the model of the ratiocinative, calculating consumer so beloved of economic psychology and private television proprietors; and its interaction with or separateness from the citizen who is to be schooled, to be trained, to be improved through the process of state action and is also to school, train and improve state actions (which is to refer, here, to the operation of television systems as sites of communication).

I seek to do so in the context of recent negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT). For this Round, although its primary interest has been in agriculture, has seen new attention paid to Trade in Services (TIS). TIS includes trade in television, and the negotiations under the GATT have seen the United States attempt to outlaw many forms of national regulation of film and television images: no more restrictions on foreign ownership of networks; no more quotas guaranteeing, for example, locally made drama; no more public subvention of the screen industries. So that's the end of 'New German Cinema'; it's the end of the Australian Film Commission and Film Finance Corporation; and it means there will never again be quite the same context for making something like Edge of Darkness because the United Kingdom operates a rule enforcing 86% local (i .e. British-made) content. It would also preclude the provision of state assistance to indigenous bourgeoisies to move into export markets. 3

The problem with active assistance through subvention is that it contravenes one of the principal formative elaborations of GATT logic; namely, that forms of state aid should be via tariffs instead of restrictions or non-tariff measures. This enables policing, because it renders such distortions to the market visible and predictable. They can therefore be planned around as well as verified. None of this, of course, is to deny the desired telos of GATT: the eventual elimination of all actions by states that hamper free trade. 4

From the time of its emergence as one of the key trading and monetary protocols of the late 1940s until the shifts and shocks of the 1970s, the GATT enshrined the key principles of the world trading system: multilateralism, non-discrimination and methods for codifying any regulation that was deemed unavoidable. These precepts operated in place of sovereign administrative discretion on the part of individual nation-states. In a move homologous to the implied social contract entered into by the citizen with the state, now the state gave something up as part of a more formal contract with an international organisation. At a rhetorical level, the GATT became the bureaucratic champion of free trade, dedicated to the removal of blocs or blocks to the 'natural' operation of a perfect market organised around the preferred rhythms of supply and demand under the intersecting signs of pure comparative advantage and consumer sovereignty.

This was very much the United States' agenda and it worked very well for the great and powerful until the appearance of the European Community and Japan as fields of real economic force. This effect was doubled by some internal loss of faith that such a liberal trading regime necessarily coincided with the US' best interests. By the 1980s, the rules of discourse of international trade set up binary opposites of liberalism and mercantilism, but with no major player staking lofty moral terrain other than on a contingent, site-specific basis. Protectionism was accepted when it worked for the speaking subject, rejected when it worked for some other entity to that speaker's detriment. In addition, the GATT's record has suffered through the very success of its legalism: for by problematising the simple and highly visible tariff, it has encouraged resistance via the emergence of new forms of protectionism appearing under the signs of nontariff implements and, latterly, industry policy.

By the end of 1990, the domestic pressure exerted on the US Executive to increase or at least sustain its own protectionism in the area of both agriculture and services was a most significant counter-pressure on policy, especially as the President's freedom to strike international agreements was legislated for via sunset bills rather than residing in freestanding, perpetual constitutional authority. 6 It appeared as though the US may be planning a less totalising approach to service industry diplomacy, one that relied on bilateral discussion until and unless the GATT paid dividends. 7

This absence of purism can come as no kind of surprise to dissident economists, who have reacted against the neo-classical model over the last 150 years for its tendentious dependence on "individual preference orderings, endowments and technology". 8 In particular, they have noted that the signified of 'free trade' has mostly been the self-interest of the most materially powerful. 9

The aim of establishing who is being formed as the subject at the base of the reasoning behind the GATT initiative in the whole area of TIS remains a valuable one. Whatever the outcome of the Uruguay Round, it is clear that the basic burden of policy planning for broadcasting in most parts of the world is ordered around a tension between accounts which take their primary mission to be that of delivering services to consumers versus those that seek to form and be formed by citizens.

The theoretical logic underpinning the critique of state protection of industries is that economies will eventually attain a mutual natural equilibrium if they are organised around already extant (i.e. non-legislated) factor endowments that provide them with a comparative advantage over others. Despite their awareness that this has favoured the already-strong, over 90 nation-states are signatories to the 100 - and counting - agreements that manifest the GATT. When the US put TIS on the agenda, it threatened to leave the GATT if others rejected the move, coinciding as this did with a decline in the value of traditional, secondary US industrialism but a clear development of its advantage in the services sector. 10 Having failed to cover cultural industries under the Free Trade Agreement with Canada signed in 1988,1l representatives of the US Trade Department were briskly lobbying the Europeans at the same time against the threatened imposition of quotas on television programs coming from outside the Community. 12

The US is especially scathing about the notion of a pan-European culture. After years of supporting European unification, there is now something of a reaction in the light of terrors about "a protectionist, corporatist, anti-American Frankenstein". 13 All this occurs in the name of a debate between the rational allocation of resources in terms of a model of comparative advantage (based on a psychology derived from theorists of citizenship: Hobbes, Locke and Mill) 14 opposed to the special circumstances claimed for the rights of cultural sovereignty that are held to be critical in the formation and service of active citizens.

There is a special irony here in the mutual origin of these doctrines. The maximising consumer and the citizen have generally functioned as quite separate technologies of the subject, although they emerged from the same source in the contract theorists and liberals of political philosophy. The contradictions between a subject that is at once utilitarian and responsible only become a problem when these generally distinct technologies are made to collide in their operation. Public policy in capitalist democracies has generally been able to keep them running in parallel or very separate movements.

So it was feasible to establish TV networks catering to different conceptions of the viewer, for instance, in ways that did not require either-or choices pitting differing ideas of the subject against one another. Doctrines of complementarity between public and private segments of a national broadcasting system might be an example, with one network dedicated to a combination of catering and uplifting, the other to profit.

The heartaches begin when the technologies are brought into an identical space, in this case the GATT negotiating table. The wise know the need to prevent a sustained interaction between two incommensurate positions

As the US Trade Mission said at the August 1990 discussions, it was vital for the GATT to:

agree to disagree on motives - cultural sovereignty or business opportunity - and then start negotiating. 15

What we're seeing here is an important juxtaposition. It opposes the idea of neo-classical economics and its anti-nationalist sentiments, whereby entities only become involved in business where they have a cost advantage over competitors, and the idea of cultural nationalism, which argues for a privileged domain that must remain outside this discourse. The national is outside because it is special, and special because it is where people are formed as people, as subjects in the sight of the special history with which their local geo-political formation is said to invest them, and which their local government is said to be able to articulate. The economic, however, assumes that persons are always already formed, and are discernible as such when they elect through free choice to support one product over another. The only problem that can conceivably be experienced here is in the accident of market distortion. Conflating the two discourses makes for enormous confusion.

In effect, the norm here is that the subject is split as part of the process and means of its governance. When network proprietors speak of the audience inside the discourse of economics, it is a clever, competent taste-broker that knows what it likes and likes what it knows (and of course, competition prevents moguls from becoming complacent). When culture bureaucrats speak of the audience inside the discourse of responsible citizenship, it is in need of protection/service in the name of cultural identity.

The first discourse may be characterised by the Pollyannaism of the US screen trade periodical, Variety. It argued at the commencement of the decade that:

as old borders come down and old ideologies give way...the lingua franca of motion pictures will command a greater worldwide audience than ever before. 16

All that has to happen for this to occur is the removal of imperfections in the free circulation of textual traffic. The most popular at the best price will inevitably rise to the top, and this will simply reflect the preferences of the audience: the fully-achieved site of rationality in television, the ultimate arbiter, the maximiser of its utility.

It's not hard to characterise the recent trend in television studies towards the production of 'active viewing' as adjacent to this paradigm. Nor is it hard to characterise its other, the paternalistic protectiveness of cultural nationalism, as related to the unfashionable pessimism (alleged) of the Frankfurt School or, worse, an odd amalgam of Arnold, Leavis, Reith and Adorno.

In the first case, at least, this would conflate quite distinct discourses. The domain of the formation of policy that situates subjects as rational maximisers of their utility is distinct from the valorisation of the audience as able to make aberrant decodings of programs. Both assume a subject that is active, but there is little else about them that is similar, although knowledge of the active viewer passed on to program makers may make for a changed supply of product in certain instances. For the subject produced by the new audience studies frequently reads against the grain in a way that may be held to bring into question the entire basis for the social relations inhering to the production of texts in the commercial world.

The second case may be stronger. What is behind the need to prevent me as a subject from being exposed to what I like? What makes it possible to argue for cultural policing that sets up certain types of text and forms of communication as better for the commonwealth than others by opposing what I want and what I need? It is the doctrine that the presentation of local images to me on my television screen will help me to see, consider and re-form my world and my relationship to it. This is a decision made at the level of cultural policy that establishes the citizen as provisionally incomplete by comparison with the bureaucrat or politician, but as capable of development and potentially ready - like Derrida/Jefferson's 'people' - to exercise certain rights to push for altered policies.

This second policy discourse is evident in the distinctly non-modish position struck by the Australian Minister for Transport and Communications in announcing in 1990 that his Government would restrict foreign ownership of local television networks to 20% because of the need to ensure "the exploration of cultural identity'';l7 or the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal advising its readership of a policy document on local content levels in 1988 that:

There appears to be a growing consensus that 60% [of primetime television programming] represents the desirable level to preserve a national identity. 18

One might cruelly add here - in a way that is emblematic of the apparently arbitrary and unspecifiable nature of utterances within this discourse - that 12 months later the Tribunal's magically-divined consensual figure had 'lost' 10%. 19

When mapped against these unargued, unsubstantiated inanities, it's very easy to support the egalitarian nature of the marketplace. After all, what better homology could there be with a regular participatory democracy? It seems attractively far distant from culture bureaucrats setting themselves up as privileged sages in the domain of determining what is necessary for others. And this is further informed by theoretical positions that challenge: the realist text; doctrines of reflectionism; and the sense that 'the nation' is other than a chauvinistic and wicked apparatus that serves to silence and denigrate. That's if the rational consumer is the right unit of analysis and ripe for amalgamation with the citizen. But it may not be.

Formal - that is to say, spoken and signed - responsibility for the carriage of Australia's negotiations at the GATT rests with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It initially regarded the audiovisual sector as an area which could usefully be traded-off in return for concessions by other countries in matters of greater significance for Australian balance of payments figures, notably farming. In any case, a liberalised TIS environment was alleged to be directly beneficial to Australia in such domains as education, finance and consulting.20 (Of course, the argument was also made that removing restrictions on market forces would ultimately make for the right conditions for a private sector screen industry anyway. 21

Because of the dominance of this logic within the DFAT team, the Australian Film Commission, a statutory authority acting multifariously as a source of script development assistance, film investment, policy advocacy, and cultural development sent a leavening representative to Geneva, as did the Australian Writers' Guild. The Guild said afterwards of the DFAT diplomats:

they now understood that serials like Neighbours, and TV commercials, were aspects of Australian culture. 22

This marks out popular programs as demotic. They are legitimated not merely by their ratings, but by their resonance, their capacity to render the everyday back to viewers. Neighbours tropes 'the people' in their collectivity and their ordinariness in this type of argument. It is not calling up a 'user-pays principle'.

The Guild pushed hard for extension of the draft exception clause to any TIS agreement to include:

a clear statement of principle that questions of cultural development are not made subservient to those of trade policy.

TV scriptwriters were not the only group that saw problems with the commensurability of the two discourses, that discerned value in their separation whilst not denying the legitimacy of either account of the person. When it was given the task of advising the Australian Treasurer about "how Australia may liberalise its trade in services" - not a 'should we?', but a 'how can we?'- the then Industries Assistance Commission flatly explained with reference to the cultural aspects of services protection that:

the trade-restricting effects of some interventions may be insignificant when weighed against the broader social purpose for which the intervention was instituted. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to comment on the merit of these goals. [original emphasis] 24

This is a clear separation of the spheres, in an unusually non-hegemonic moment for conventional economic discourse: here is an area where the locus of understanding may not lie in the calculation of the price that an imaginary individual might be prepared to pay for something.

This space outside the scope of monetary-methodological individualism is that occupied by citizenship. Prior to the advent of the welfare state, classical liberal political theory decreed that citizens had political rights to representation and civil rights to relative freedom (up to the point where this contravened the same right of another). The third, distinctively modernist, component of the discourse of citizenship was the notion of a minimum standard of living guaranteed by a welfare state. The most recent decisive innovation, the postmodernist guarantee, falls in the area of providing access to the technologies and techniques of communication as crucial integers in the set of polity and personal identity. Where the modernist move depended on subjects recognising their debt to the great institutions of the state, the postmodernist derives its power from a sense that such institutions need to relearn what sovereignty is about in polymorphous nation-states that are diminishingly homogeneous in demographic terms and increasingly heteroglossic in their cultural competence.

Debates over the Charter 88 movement in Britain - an attempt, inter alia, to construct a formal basis for being British, in a way that claims a genesis in the New Statesman - have occluded around the question of the notion of the individualism of the citizen. Is this the 'nice' side of the person who is also the utterly selfish utilitarian? Was Douglas Hurd's advocacy of "active citizenship" a cipher for a Government that needed to appear caring and sharing? Is there some kind of contradiction between the human subject if it is made to combine the communitarian selflessness of citizenship with the dynamic entrepreneurial competitiveness of the marketeer? 26

It may be that they are in no kind of relation whatsoever, other than at the points of tension, like the GATT and 'Enterprise Britain', where two quite distinct formulations of person - both extremely powerful as theoretical accounts and as influences on distinct domains of policy and general discourse - are made to rub against one another. This makes largely mutually exclusive understandings come together, almost inadvertently. The result is crisis diplomacy to wrench them apart: Australian screenwriters rush their representative to Switzerland to say so and the US Trade Department is already there doing it from the other side. Both know that not all frottage is productive.

Consider the kinds of questions that appear if one permits these two discourses such an assignation: should we associate freer trade in TV with a more active citizen? Will increased American product on screens around the globe represent consumer desires and the rich weave of the people's difference? Well, only in the loosest sense. Because like all ahistorical psy-complexes, the maximiser of utility is founded on the pre-existent individual. But this may well be the wrong category to enter if we wish to talk sensibly about the international marketplace for screen products. Consider for a moment the US-produced TV series. Through a combination of first run distribution on the networks, subsequent distribution through off-network syndication and solid expectations of overseas sales, US producers can underwrite the debt financing structures of their series production. Even though anticipated revenue from overseas sales is a component factored into productions from the start, the US has remarkable flexibility in terms of what it charges internationally. Prices can be set in foreign markets at whatever is a competitive figure there, always at a point below what local program makers can sustain. The capacity to do this is a consequence of the sheer size of the US market and the greater economies of scale available to it. How is the consumer model relevant here? Where is the comparison to shopping? Consumer preferences may be a marginal category in terms of programs and how they got to be on international TV screens in the first place.

It is becoming clear that there may in fact be little value in trying to integrate these accounts of the audience. Perhaps we should say that the person is sometimes known as a consuming agent, sometimes as a member of the polity; that in the latter guise, people are conventionally taught about the role of the state, the nature of culture, the principles of private property and the conduct of exchange. Whereas in the former guise, they are trained to function as selfish creatures, confident in the knowledge that the operation of supply and demand and the laws of the repressive state apparatus will prevent them from jeopardising the conditions under which they can exist. We should see that these are productive categories of discourse. They are used to argue for what are often contending administrative projects that, to repeat, generally surface in distinct domains. So, decisions about public subvention of screen drama might be made with an eye to externalities such as overseas image and export, but they have principally been about ensuring that citizens are given something of their own to watch and ponder. And decisions about trade policy tend to be made with a concentration on factor endowments, efficient allocation of preferences and so on. Outside aberrant moments such as the Uruguay Round, the two positions can remain safely apart.

It becomes necessary, then, for the purposes of analysis, to understand that these stories about the subject can be seen as an opportunity. They are an opportunity for different cultural projects to exploit precisely because of their contradictoriness. This is decidedly not the psychologised subject, although it is decidedly split: split in discourse. There will continue to be spaces opening up within the domain of both private and public television policy in liberal capitalist democracies along these lines of fracture, spaces that are under categories such as minority programming, multicultures, arts, 'quality' drama, 'women's' soap opera and popular music. Some of these - my latter examples - come to the screen via what might be called managed capitalism (the strictly monopoly competition that marks so hugely expensive an industry). The others derive more from the notion of responsiveness to the minority that remains part of the discourse of citizenship in such polities: by being one of the many, we receive certain rights to be different, provided that they can be exercised under this limited sign.

David Williamson wrote a letter to the national daily, The Australian, in his 1989 capacity as President of the Australian Writers' Guild:

It is not to protect an industry, or even employment, that Australian content in commercial television is so crucial. It is for the sake of an Australian culture. We as children grew up seeing ourselves as exiles from real life which only happened in the rest of the world. That is not what we want now for ourselves or for our children. 27

Like the 'we' that Derrida sought so desperately, this interpellates and thereby forms the very object which it claims as a pre-existent legitimising authority for its speech. And like the Declaration of Independence, it seems to separate the spheres of subjectivity between words like "industry", and "employment" on one side and "culture" and "our/we" on the other. It sits well alongside the similar separation called for by the French, the Indians, the Brazilians and others at the GATT.28 During the Geneva debates, most countries agreed about a special "cultural importance" inhering to the audiovisual sector. India and Canada argued for the addition to the Draft Services Trade Framework for audiovisual services of a clause which would provide an exemption from laissez-faire protocols "for assistance measures imposed for cultural reasons". The European Community preferred a sectoral annotation, which would allow for greater flexibility by permitting space for future types of subvention that might be required to develop various aspects of the audiovisual continuum. Japan and Australia spoke favourably of the need to maintain cultural sovereignty but w ere non-committal on the specifics of the Draft. 29 "Culture" here is being made to matter because it is where people are held to make themselves, 'television culture' most of all because it is so rapid, diffusable and advanced in its marketing.

It is another task to account for, or weigh up, these policy discourses as agents of particular interests and with particular material outcomes. Here, what I have sought to do is simply to point to the significance of the confluence of the different categories of person hailed and manufactured by their models of the subject.

What would be the outcome of denying or disabling the split in this subject, of seeking a resolution between the categories under present modes of production and distribution? Not a very active citizen. As Eagleton says:

No longer torn asunder between blind individualism and abstract universalism, the reborn subject lives its existence, we might claim, aesthetically, in accordance with a law which is now entirely at one with its spontaneous being. What finally secures social order is that realm of customary practice and instinctual piety, more supple and resilient than abstract rights, where the living energies and affections of subjects are invested. 30

This is the field that ideal cultural subjects find themselves in, subjects that can synthesise two incompatible requirements. This synthesis is a logical outcome from and input to the world of possessive individualism, resulting from the requirement that such subjects order their lives uniformly and integrate the orders of discourse of the citizen and the consumer.

Ourselves, we prefer dispersal. And this dispersal is not derived from notions of the ravaged and ravishing split subjectivity of persons that are commonplaces in postmodernist discourse. This is not a psy-divide. This is a policy divide of possibilities.

Notes

For their assistance in the preparation of this article I would like to thank John Hartley and Tom O'Regan.

1. Jacques Derrida, "Women in the Beehive: A Seminar with Jacques Derrida" in Alice Jardine and Paul Smith eds., Men in Feminism (New York and London: Methuen, 1987),p.200.

2. Philip Schlesinger, "On National Identity: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions Criticized", Social Science Information, v.26,n.2 (1987), p.222.

3. "Oz Production:Meat in Trade Sandwich?", Communications Update,no.59 (1990),p.8.

4. Desmond Peart, "Caribbean Community States and the GATT' in B.B.Ramcharan and C.B.Francis eds., Caribbean Perspectives on International Law and Organisations (Dordrecht, Boston and London:Martinus Nijhoff, 1989),pp.186-187.

5. Richard A.Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building:Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations",lnternational Organization v.44,n.4 (1990),pp.590 and 592-594. Also see J.G.Starke, Introduction to International Law, tenth ed. (London:Butterworths, 1989), p.386.

6. David S. Cloud, "GATT Negotiations Fall Silent Amid Export Subsidy Woes",Congressional Quarterly,v.48,n.50 (1990),pp.4141-4142, "Congress Angry at European TV Restrictions",Telecommunications Update,v.V,n.11 (1990), p.1 and John Huey, "America's Hottest Export: Pop Culture", Fortune International, no.29 (1990),p.25.

7. "GATT:The Other War",The Economist,v.318,n.769 (1991 ),p.70.

8. Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, "Radical Differences Among Radical Theories",Review of Radical Political Economics, v.20,n.2&3 (1988), p.1.

9. Rudolf Walther, "Economic Liberalism",Economy and Society, v.13,n.2 (1984),p.190.

10. Sandra Braman, "Trade and Information Policy",Media, Culture and Society, v.12,n.3 (1990),pp.361 and 365.

11. Colin Hoskins et al., "U.S. Television Programs in the International Market: Unfair Pricing?", Journal of Communication, v.39, n.2 (1989), p.57.

12. "Europe's 'TV Without Frontiers' Missteps at Final Hurdle", Broadcasting Abroad (July 1989),p.6.

13. Peter Brimelow, "The Dark Side of 1992", Forbes, v.145,n.2 (] 990), p.85.

14. See Brian De Uriarte, "On the Free Will of Rational Agents in Neoclassical Economics", Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, v.12,n.4 (1990),pp.605-610 and 613-614 and Raphael Sassower, "Economics and Psychology: Estranged Bedfellows or Fellow Travellers? A Critical ' Synthesis", Social Epistemology, v.3, n.4 (1989), pp.269 and 273-275.

15. "GATT:Plenty of Talk, Answers yet to Come", AFC News, no.87 (1990), p.1.

16. Richard Gold, "Globalization:Gospel for the '90s?",Variety (2 May 1990), p.0-1.

17. Australian Film Commission, "G.A.T.T. Services Framework: Comments on the Application to Audio-Visual Industries of the Draft Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services" (1990), p.10.

18. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, Australian Content Inquiry Discussion Paper:Amounts of time Occupied by Different Program Categories (1988) p.3.

19. "G.A.T.T. Services", pp.11-12.

20. Alan L.Lougheed, Australia and the World Economy (Fitzroy, Ringwood Harmondsworth, New York, Ontario and Auckland: McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988), p.61.

21. Anthony I.Ginnane, "Requiem for the Australian Film Industry",Cinema Papers, nos.44-45 (1984), p.67.

22. "Oz Production", loc.cit.

23. "GATT:The Fight that was Almost Lost before it Started", Filmnews, v.20,n.8 (1990), p.3.

24. Industries Assistance Commission, Assessing Barriers to International Trade in Services,Inquiry into International Trade in Services,Discussion Paper No.2,(Canberra:Australian Government Publishing Service 1989), p.13.

25. Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, "Information Poverty and Political Inequality:Citizenship in the Age of Privatized Communications", Journal of Communication, v.39, n.3 (1989), pp.l81-184.

26. Geoff Andrews, "Universal Principles",Marxism Today, August 1990, pp.l6-17 and Marshall Dimock, "The Restorative Qualities of Citizenship", Public Administration Review, v.50,n.1 (1990), pp.21-22 and

27. David Williamson, "Arts 1 :Aussie Content At Risk", The Australian, 9 November 1989, p.l6.

28. Braman,loc.cit.

29. "GATT:Plenty", loc.cit.

30. Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford and Cambridge Mass.:Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.22.


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